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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Colombia's increasingly effective efforts to mitigate the 
power of the FARC and other illegitimately armed groups in 
the country can offer important lessons for the Peruvian 
government as it strives to prevent a resurgence of Sendero 
Luminoso and other illegal non-state actors. Both countries 
share certain particular challenges: deep economic, social, 
and in the case of Peru ethnic divisions, the presence of 
and/or the effects of violent insurgencies, large-scale 
narcotics production and trafficking, and a history of weak 
state presence in large tracts of isolated and scarcely-
populated areas. Important differences exist, however in the 
nature of the insurgencies in the two countries, the 
government response to them and the nature of government 
and society that affects the applicability of Colombia's 
experience to Peru. 
The security threat to Panama from drug trafficking and 
Colombian insurgents -often a linked phenomenon-- are in 
many ways different from the drug/insurgent factor in 
Colombia itself and in Peru, although there are similar 
variables. Unlike the Colombian and Peruvian cases, the 
security threat in Panama is not directed against the state, 
there are no domestic elements seeking to overthrow the 
government - as the case of the F ARC and Sendero 
Luminoso, security problems have not spilled over from rural 
to urban areas in Panama, and there is no ideological 
component at play in driving the threat. Nor is drug 
cultivation a major factor in Panama as it is in Colombia and 
Peru. 
The key variable that is shared among all three cases is the 
threat of extra-state actors controlling remote rural areas or 
small towns where state presence is minimal. The central 
lesson learned from Colombia is the need to defme and then 
address the key problem of a "sovereignty gap," lack of a 
legitimate state presence in many part of the country. 
1 
Colombia's success in broadening the presence of the 
national govermnent between 2002 and the presence is owed 
to many factors, including an effective national strategy, 
improvements in the armed forces and police, political will 
on the part of government for a sustained effort, citizen buy-
in to the national strategy, including the resolve of the elite 
to pay more in taxes to bring change about, and the adoption 
of a sequenced approach to consolidated development in 
conflicted areas. Control of territory and effective state 
presence improved citizen security, strengthened confidence 
in democracy and the legitimate state, promoted economic 
development, and helped mitigate the effect of illegal drugs. 
Peru can benefit from the Colombian experience especially 
in terms of the importance of legitimate state authority, 
improved institutions, gaining the support of local citizens, 
and furthering development to wean communities away from 
drugs. State coordinated "integration" efforts in Peru as 
practiced in Colombia have the potential for success if 
properly calibrated to Peruvian reality, coordinated within 
government, and provided with sufficient resources. Peru's 
traditionally weak political institutions and lack of public 
confidence in the state in many areas of the country must be 
overcome if this effort is to be successful. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The death of the top military commander of the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) alias 
"Jorge Briceiio" aka "Mono Jojoy" on September 22, 2010 
in a bombing raid conducted by the Colombian military 
highlighted the progress that country has made in a decade-
long effort to establish legitimate state authority throughout 
its national territory. At the time of his death, Briceiio was 
hunkered down in underground bunkers dug into the 
mountains in the municipality of La Uribe, located in the so-
called "Macarena" region of Meta Department, about 
21 Okrn south of Bogota. Four of the six municipalities of the 
Macarena region, along with a municipality in neighboring 
Caqueta Department constituted the 42,000 square krn 
demilitarized zone (zona de despeje) created in an agreement 
between then-President Andres Pastrana and the FARC in 
1998 to facilitate peace talks. This area of Colombia had 
been a traditional FARC stronghold before 1998, but the 
zona de despeje arrangement allowed the F ARC near 
sovereign control over the area for 28 months. The F ARC 
responded by turning it into a command and control center 
for its national operations, for stationing thousand of its 
fighters, as well as for industrial-scale coca production 
during the 28-month period while the despeje agreement 
remained in force. 
In the wake of the failed peace process, which ground to a 
halt in early 2002, the Colombia government initiated what 
was to become an increasingly effective campaign to roll 
back the power of the FARC and other illegally armed 
groups in the country and in the process take control over 
large areas of national territory where legitimate state 
presence had been usurped or where it had never existed. 
The government's eventual success in the Macarena region, 
the heartland ofF ARC military strength and a mainstay in its 
cocaine-based economic support structure, resulted from 
strategic and tactical decisions taken during President Alvaro 
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Uribe's second term in office aimed at a sequenced approach 
to the consolidation of state authority, starting with securing 
territory by the military, followed by the establishment of a 
police presence, the eradication of coca production, either 
voluntary or forced, and the eventual rise of a legal 
economy. The Macarena region in fact became the first test 
case of this new strategy, manifested in the "Plan of Integral 
Consolidation of the Macarena" (PCIM) launched by the 
government of Colombia with support from the United 
States and the Netherlands in August 2007. This sequenced 
approach to security and development was subsequently 
applied to other highly conflictive areas of Colombia, such 
as the "Montes de Maria "highlands in Bolivar and Sucre 
departments, in the southern part of the Department of 
Tolima and in the Department ofNariii.o. 
Efforts by the Colombian government have neutralized the 
military capabilities of the FARC. Briceno and the remnants 
of the once-powerful FARC fronts in the Macarena region 
had been pushed deeply into the mountainous hinterland of 
the area and limited to small-scale defensive operations 
several years before his demise. This process was repeated 
on a national scale. During the past decade, Colombia came 
back from the brink of a national meltdown to the point 
where its security is no longer threatened by insurgents, 
paramilitaries, and criminal gangs - all fueled by the 
narcotics industry. Colombia's progress since the launching 
of the bilateral initiative with the United States known as 
"Plan Colombia" in 2000 offers important lessons for other 
states threatened by the forces that undermined legitimate 
authority in Colombia. More specifically, its integrated 
approach to consolidating state control may in particular 
serve as an important point of reference. While the 
effectiveness of the PCIM in the Macarena and similar 
efforts elsewhere in Colombia still require further 
assessment, the strategic approach to security and 
development they embody makes sense in the Colombian 
case. 
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This essay will review the lessons learned from Colombia's 
efforts at consolidating legitimate state control - specifically 
the case of the PCIM - and their applicability to Peru, a 
country once gravely threatened by violent insurgencies and 
still marked by deep economic, social, and ethnic divisions 
that could lead to future conflict, as well as the implications 
for Panama's Darien Region. Both countries are affected by 
narcotics production and trafficking and a history of very 
weak state presence in large tracts of isolated and scarcely-
populated areas. Important differences exist, however, in 
the nature of the FARC and Sendero Luminoso insurgencies, 
and even more in the Darien Region, the government 
response to them, and in the nature of government and 
society in the two countries that will affect the applicability 
of Colombia's experience to Peru or Panama. Nonetheless, 
there is value in reviewing the key lessons from Colombia in 
light of the future challenges faced by Peru, and perhaps 
Panama. 
LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE COLOMBIAN EXPERIENCE 
Colombia's central weakness throughout its history has been 
the inability of govermnent to exercise authority over much 
of its national territory. (This analysis is derived from: Peter 
DeShazo, Johanna Mendelson Forman and Phillip McLean, 
Countering Threats to Security and Stability in a Failing 
State: Lessons from Colombia, CSIS 2009.) This 
sovereignty gap had been a consistent factor in Colombia's 
history, but it rose to prominence with the coca boom in the 
1990s when insurgencies such as the F ARC and Army of 
National Liberation (ELN) used ungoverned areas as a 
staging ground for attacks against state presence in urban 
areas- isolated military bases and police stations being 
favorite targets. Drug production fueled the power of the 
insurgents, as well as the paramilitary armies that took form 
during the 1990s both as a counterweight to F ARC influence 
in many rural areas and to contest the insurgents for control 
over coca production and drug trafficking. Colombia's 
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difficult geography, vast ungoverned spaces and the drug 
industry all conspired against the traditionally weak 
Colombian state. By the late 1990s, the insurgents were 
capable of defeating the ineffective and demoralized 
Colombian army in pitched battles at the battalion level, 
while the Colombian National Police didn't stand a chance 
against better armed and more numerous guerrilla units. 
State authority imploded all over the country as the F ARC 
carried out a strategy of expanding its theatre of operations, 
controlling strategic corridors allowing its different fronts to 
link up and facilitate the movement of drugs, supplies and 
weapons, and gradually encircling Bogota and other 
principal cities. 
Recovery from Colombia's precipitous slide towards 
potential state failure began during the Pastrana 
administration (1998-2002) when the Colombian army began 
to be reorganized and increased in size. This process 
accelerated during the first term in office of President Alvaro 
Uribe (2002-2006). More importantly, Uribe and his 
advisors developed a coherent counter-insurgency strategy 
based on taking and holding territory, protecting local 
populations, controlling key geographic corridors essential to 
drug trafficking and supply and mobility for insurgents, and 
demobilizing the paramilitary forces that in the end 
threatened democracy and state authority as gravely as did 
the F ARC. This strategy - the "Democratic Security Policy" 
very correctly identified the sovereignty gap as the central 
problem in Colombia and the strengthening of legitimate 
state control the key antidote. This policy was adjusted and 
upgraded over time, but it essentially was executed during 
the entire eight-year period of Uribe's presidency, with 
continuation into the new administration of Juan Manuel 
Santos (2010-). 
To carry out his Democratic Security Policy, Uribe 
understood that the size and capability of the armed forces 
and police would have to be increased substantially, that it 
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needed far greater mobility, and that substantial amounts of 
resources would have to be dedicated to this effort on a 
sustained basis. Accordingly, spending on security rose 
sharply during the first years of the Uribe administration, 
funded in part by a special tax on Colombia's wealthiest 
citizens and businesses and with support from the United 
States. Between 2002 and 2009, Uribe increased the size of 
the armed forces by 39 per cent and the police by a third. 
As importantly, he increased the number of professional 
soldiers in the army - the core counterinsurgency force - by 
56 per cent during the same period, forming scores of new 
brigade and battalion-sized units, many trained by the United 
States under Plan Colombia assistance. A local home guard 
force called soldados de mi pueblo ("hometown soldiers") 
was stood up, organized in special platoons of 40 men and 
based largely in rural towns in some 600 locations across the 
country, largely to hold down territory, disrupt insurgent 
supply corridors and demonstrate state presence, freeing up 
more elite troops for combat missions. 
In parallel, the Colombian National Police was vastly 
expanded and strengthened. From 2002 to 2009, nearly 300 
new police stations and sub-stations were established, mainly 
in rural areas, and staffed with national police. The existing 
force of rural police (carabineros) was expanded to some 
7,400 strong, with special "mobile squadrons" of heavily-
armed units trained as light infantry created to patrol 
particularly conflictive areas and to assist in narcotics 
eradication. 
A major effort was made to increase the mobility of the 
Colombian armed forces and police, based on rotary airlift 
capability. At the beginning of the Pastrana administration, 
the armed forces had about 20 helicopters. By 2008, 
Colombia operated the third largest fleet of Black Hawk (UH 
60-L and AH 60L) helicopters in the world, with more than 
70 units (as of2009) and a total helicopter fleet of nearly 200 
in 2008. These assets gave the Colombian armed forces with 
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an enormous advantage in counter-insurgency operations in 
mountainous and rural areas. Other aircraft, such as the 
Embaer 314 "Super Tucano" light attack plane (the aircraft 
used in the bombing raids against the F ARC camps that 
resulted in the deaths of top F ARC leaders "RaUl Reyes" and 
"Mono Jojoy") were added to the fleet. 
Colombian counterinsurgency capabilities improved in many 
other ways, often with U.S. support. Training, 
professionalization, intelligence capability, administration, 
supply, maintenance of equipment, night operational 
capability, NCO training, and human rights awareness were 
all improved substantially. 
With improvements in the size, capability, and strategy and 
tactics of the armed forces and police, Colombia was able to 
neutralize the F ARC, virtually eliminate the ELN as a force, 
bring about the demobilization of nearly 30,000 paramilitary 
fighters, and substantially reduce the weight of the drug 
economy as a factor affecting the country's security and 
development. In the wake of the killing of Briceii.o/Mono 
Jojoy, the FARC should be nearing the point in which it is 
willing to consider peace talks. While criminal gangs 
engaged in drug trafficking still put a serious strain on law 
enforcement, they no longer pose a state security threat. 
Colombia still faces serious challenges, including deeply 
entrenched poverty, inequality, weak judicial systems, and 
persistently high levels of crime, but the crisis stage has been 
passed and the future of the country is more positive than 
anyone could have hoped ten years ago. 
In 2007, the Colombian goverrnnent, with U.S. support, 
shifted gears in its effort to establish effective state presence 
in areas formerly controlled by illegal armed groups. That 
year, it undertook a new strategy for consolidating state 
authority that was first applied in the Macarena region of 
Meta department-- the PCIM. (For a mid-stream evaluation 
of the effectiveness of PCIM, see: Peter DeShazo, Phillip 
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McLean and Johanna Mendelson Forman, Colombia's Plan 
de Consolidaci6n Integral de Ia Macarena An Assessment, 
CSIS, June 2009). This was a sequenced approach by which 
areas secured by the military - in this case the very effective 
Task Force Omega of the Colombian armed forces - are 
gradually turned over to police forces for law enforcement 
and narcotics eradication. As areas become secure enough, 
PCIM civilian employees enter the areas to engage local 
populations in rounds of discussions on the kinds of projects 
and activities most needed in each community to promote 
economic and social development. These efforts are aimed 
at producing letter-of-reference agreements between PCIM 
development entities and local communities - in essence 
obtaining "buy-in" from resident populations for the 
individual development projects to be carried out. In the 
case of the Macarena, local communities were most 
concerned about the need for tertiary roads to get cash crops 
to market, access to farm machinery and to credit, the need 
for technical assistance to farmers, and land titling to 
leverage credit and provide stability for rural communities. 
To better coordinate civil-military efforts, PCIM established 
a "fusion center" for each project, basically a small 
headquarters operation on the ground in the zone itself, out 
of which all elements of the PCIM operated. 
The experience of PCIM and other such efforts in Colombia 
is yet to be fully evaluated. Certain conclusions can, 
however, be drawn from the PCIM that are relevant 
elsewhere. The consolidation of effective security is 
essential but the sooner military units can be replaced by 
civilian police the better. At the same time, policing needs to 
be community-based, with officers and agents reaching out 
to the local communities to win their trust. Without effective 
security, counter-drug initiatives and social and economic 
development will not be possible. The PCIM experience 
also underscored the need for a greater civilian role in the 
consolidation of state presence. The military part - in the 
case of Colombia- was important but buy-in to the model of 
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integral development from the Ministry of Defense has been 
more enthusiastic than from other ministries, especially key 
ones such as Agriculture or the social development agency 
Accion Social. Civilian inputs at an early stage in the 
process are necessary to enlist citizen support and 
cooperation. This must be across the board - including 
teachers, health workers, and support for incipient municipal 
government, agricultural extension, judicial authorities, and 
sources of credit. 
In the case of PCIM, greater civilian resource support from 
within the Colombian government was identified as the key 
ingredient that would determine the success or failure of 
integrated development efforts. For that reason, the 
establishment of a government coordinating body to 
supervise efforts such as PCIM led by a figure reporting 
directly to the president and with the authority to elicit and 
obtain resources from the civilian ministries and agencies is 
essential. As guerillas are pushed out of areas and state 
authority is established, local residents need to see the value 
of a state presence immediately in terms of improving their 
lives. This is especially important if the cultivation of coca 
is to be carried out on a sustained basis. Local farmers must 
be convinced that government authority is permanent, that 
there is no future in growing coca but also that viable 
alternatives exist. Forced eradication with no follow-up in 
terms of even short-term subsidies or cash payments for local 
farmers will alienate them from the state. 
The key lessons learned from Colombia's expenence 
include: 
• A Colombia-specific response was required to 
address Colombia's crisis- not a formulaic approach. 
• The root of Colombia's security crisis stemmed from 
a weak state incapable of exercising legitimate state 
authority and solution of the crisis needed to be based 
on remediation of this phenomenon, including 
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undercutting the ability of non-state factors to use 
force. 
• Illegal narcotics were not the root of the problem but 
an exacerbating factor, creating an asymmetric 
resource relationship between illegal armed groups 
and the state. 
• Colombian efforts underscored the concept of 
security as a public good. The focus on security and 
the government's ability to exercise authority became 
the key deliverable of the Uribe administration. 
• Progress in delivering state security generated strong 
support for the government among the Colombian 
people. 
• Colombia's counter-guerilla campaign never became 
a war against its own people. Colombia's armed 
forces did not engage in widespread human rights 
violation but rather won popularity as a defender of 
public security. 
• Colombia's security strategy from the start included 
counter-drug and economic development aspects, but 
these became more integrated and effective 
components only over time. They were dependent on 
the establishment of security as a precondition. 
• A successful security strategy required sustained 
political will and resources. Colombian elites were 
expected to pay the lion's share of the expense 
through higher taxes. 
• As the internal conflict abated, efforts shifted from 
the military to the law enforcement sphere, with 
fewer troops and more police needed. 
• Police in Colombia are still in the necessary process 
of adapting from the mentality of garrison forces to 
co=unity-based police interfacing with the people. 
• Control of territory and effective state presence led to 
a sharp reduction in crime and violence. 
• Government control over territory, key 
transportation, energy and co=unications 
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infrastructure has enhanced prospects for economic 
development. 
• The rule oflaw remains Colombia's weakest element 
and the one requiring the most enhanced attention by 
the gove=ent. The future of effective and 
sustained state control will depend on far more 
gove=ent resources being dedicated to the rule of 
law. 
• Counter -drug efforts cannot be successful or 
sustained without a legitimate state presence on the 
ground. 
• Counter-drug campaigns must be multi-faceted, 
balancing eradication with the establishment of 
security and development. 
• If insurgents or drug gangs have the capability of 
forcing or cajoling farmers into growing coca, the 
chances for cultivation of legitimate crops will be 
poor. Appeals to grow substitute crops when coca 
remains an option are not effective. 
• "Alternative development" initiatives to drugs are 
likely to fail unless they are carried out in an 
environment of reasonable state presence and control. 
They must also be economically feasible. 
APPLICABILITY OF LESSONS FROM THE COLOMBIAN 
EXPERIENCE IN PERU 
Peru's experience with Sendero Luminoso (SL) and the 
Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru (MRTA) differed 
from Colombia's efforts against its own insurgencies in 
several important ways. Furthermore, differences in the 
nature of Peruvian and Colombian society have an important 
bearing on the applicability of Colombia's efforts at 
consolidating an integral development strategy. There are, 
nonetheless, important similarities and useful points of 
reference. 
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The rise and fall of SL took place during a quite limited 
period of time compared with the history of the FARC- still 
ongoing - in Colombia, due to important differences 
between the two insurgent groups. While both movements 
were inspired by Marxism, the FARC paid far less attention 
to ideology than SL, which became totally imbued with 
revolutionary zeal. While the F ARC had a definite 
hierarchy, its leadership was more dispersed than SL, which 
had an undisputed leader who developed an extraordinary 
cult of the personality around him. The collapse of SL with 
the capture of Abirnael Guzman in 1992 has had no 
replication in Colombia with the death of "Manuel 
Marulanda" although the Colombian strategy of putting 
extreme pressure on top F ARC leadership is over time 
bearing fruit and has greatly weakened that organization. 
The ideological fanaticism of SL caused it to commit 
incredible acts of savagery directed against local, often 
indigenous populations in Peru, resulting in the alienation of 
SL from most of society. For its part, the FARC also 
committed widespread abuses and failed to gain popular 
support, but was more pragmatic and patient in launching 
attacks against the state. Because SL had a greater presence 
in towns, with Guzman establishing his headquarters in 
Lima, Sendero could be more easily dealt with by Peruvian 
security forces than the F ARC, which operated over a vast 
area of territory. SL's larger size (perhaps 23,000 fighters at 
peak compared with the FARC's peak order of battle 
strength of about 17 ,000) was concentrated in a smaller 
space, rendering it a more accessible target. 
The Peruvian response to SL underscored in reverse some of 
the lessons from Colombia. The terrible human rights 
violations committed by the Peruvian army during the 
Belafulde administration (1980-1985) in counter SL helped 
fuel support for the insurgency, whereas Colombia's armed 
forces never engaged in a war of terror against their own 
citizens. The excellent relationship between the Colombian 
armed forces and the civilian government - particularly 
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during the Uribe administration - was clearly not the case 
during the years of the Alan Garcia government (1985-
1990), although Garcia did rein in the human rights abuses. 
Colombia's long tradition of civilian control of the military 
certainly set it apart from Peru in this regard. Both 
Colombia and Peru's armed forces were underfunded during 
key periods when they faced a determined insurgency and 
only improved as more resources became available, 
including for salaries. Peru's army, however, was never 
transformed into the professional counter-insurgency force 
that Colombia's became. Increased intelligence capability 
played an especially important role in undermining both SL 
and the F ARC - above all in allowing for the capture or 
killing of top leadership. 
Lack of legitimate state authority played a large role in 
encouraging illegal armed groups in both countries. 
Colombia is moving more effectively to resolve that 
problem. While the SL insurgency was largely crushed by 
the mid-1990s, the state presence in many areas of Peru 
remains weak - even in areas of relatively larger population, 
especially in the heavily indigenous areas of the central and 
southern Andes. Although SL alienated indigenous 
populations with its violence and fanaticism, the Peruvian 
state did not profit much from this process. Widespread 
distrust of the government remains in the highland areas of 
the country where the SL insurgency was especially strong -
as evidenced by the large vote in those areas for the anti-
system candidate Ollanta Humala in the 2006 presidential 
election. The defeat of SL was not followed by the 
consolidation of an effective state presence in the highlands: 
judicial authorities, police, and economic development. 
Continued poverty and alienation remains a fact of life in the 
highland and well as Amazon regions. The violent 
confrontation between police units and indigenous protestors 
in the Amazon region town of Bagua in June 2009 which 
resulted m several dozen deaths underscored the 
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confrontational mentality and degree of alienation that exists 
with regard to the state. 
It is highly likely that in the April 2011 presidential 
elections, indigenous voters in Peru will turn out in large 
numbers to vote for a candidate who runs against the status 
quo - like Humala in 2006. A possible scenario for Peru 
would be a re-channeling of the frustration and violence 
unleashed by SL along ethnic rather than class lines, with 
important elements of the indigenous population turning 
away from the national state. Indigenous political 
participation in Peru has traditionally been mobilized by 
non-indigenous parties or movements, including the Marxist 
left, reformist military elements, and radical populists, but 
this is changing with the rise of indigenous-based 
movements such as Peru Plurinacional. Indigenous people 
in the Andes and Amazon have not substantially shared in 
the benefits of Peru's rapidly expanding economy during the 
past decade, which has exacerbated the already-great social 
and economic disparity between Lima and the coast, on the 
one hand, and the highlands on the other. 
Peru's leadership can take away some important lessons 
from Colombia and from that country's recent efforts to 
promote integrated development. One regards the 
legitimacy and authority of the state, manifested in control of 
territory but also in the presence of state institutions and 
services that enlist the support of local citizens. While 
expectations for improvements are high in Colombia and 
frustration could set in if not attended to, there is already 
alienation from the state in some heavily indigenous areas of 
the state in Peru. The Peruvian government needs to make a 
much larger effort to establish an effective police-based 
security presence in these areas, but with strong community 
ties. 
Colombia has also demonstrated that without a legitimate 
state security presence on the ground, effective counter-drug 
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activities, especially manual eradication, is ineffective. 
Likewise, so-called "alternative development" projects 
aimed at substituting other crops for coca will fail if the 
cultivation and commercialization of coca remains an option. 
However, the state must provide transitional resources, 
subsidies, and services to communities involved in 
eradication of coca, as well as longer-term inputs to activate 
a sustainable legal economy. Enlisting the private sector and 
civil society in this effort is also important. 
The idea of the state coordinating its "integration" efforts in 
conflict zones makes sense in Peru - at least in terms of 
better coordination, both at the national and the local level 
of the many state entities needed to improve security, 
counter-drug efforts, economic development, governance, 
and the delivery of social services. Presidential support for 
such an initiative is essential, since the resources of many 
different government entities must be eulisted - resources 
that many of them would rather invest elsewhere unless 
directed to do so from the top. While Peru's national 
security is not threatened by an insurgency, it should 
nonetheless look to the case of Colombia in terms of the 
benefit of special taxes levied on those most able to pay and 
specifically focused on certain key improvements- such as 
strengthening the judiciary, rural infrastructure, health, and 
education in areas of civil unrest or heavy coca cultivation. 
Colombian society refused to deal with the terrible problems 
affiicting the country until it was almost too late and still 
must not be complacent, since substantial weaknesses remain 
in terms of the rule of law, governance, and poverty. Peru 
beat back the SL insurgency, but at a deep and lingering cost. 
Despite its notable economic successes, Peru still faces many 
of the institutional weaknesses of the past, but in a society 
lacking the political consensus and public support for the 
state that Colombia enjoys. Peruvian leaders should take 
note of the lessons from Colombia and redouble their own 
efforts to strengthen legitimate state presence in areas where 
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it is weak and begin to reverse the confidence gap that 
distances many citizens from their government. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DARIEN 
The Darien region of Panama, including the Province of the 
Darien and portions of the Cornarca of Kuna Y ala, have long 
been affected by the activities of drug trafficking and the 
presence of both F ARC insurgents and paramilitary units 
crossing the border from neighboring Colombia. By all 
indications, security concerns in the Darien caused by drugs 
and the F ARC have sharpened in recent years, the former a 
reflection of an increase in drug trafficking out of the 
Colombian Department of the Choc6, which borders the 
Province of Darien, and the latter the result of successes by 
the Colombian government against F ARC fronts in the 
Uraba region of Antioquia, causing F ARC units to seek 
refuge in Panama. 
The security threats to Panama from drug trafficking and 
Colombian insurgents - often a linked phenomenon -- are in 
many ways different from the drug/insurgent factor in 
Colombia itself and in Peru, although there are similar 
variables. Unlike the Colombian and Peruvian cases, the 
security threat in Panama is not directed against the state, 
there are no domestic elements seeking to overthrow the 
government - as the case of the F ARC and Sendero 
Luminoso, security problems have not spilled over from rural 
to urban areas in Panama, and there is no ideological 
component at play in driving the threat. Nor is drug 
cultivation a major factor in Panama as it is in Colombia and 
Peru. 
The key variable that is shared among all three cases is the 
threat of extra-state actors controlling remote rural areas or 
small towns where state presence is minimal. The security 
threat to Panama is derived from the larger effects of drug 
trafficking, threats to the safety and well-being of the largely 
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indigenous population of the Darien, concerns about 
accelerated environmental degradation in the rich Darien 
rainforest, and the potential that extra-state elements could 
eventually control a piece of national territory in Panama. 
These variables have regional and international implications, 
including for the United States. 
Colombia's response to the insurgent/drug threat is also 
partially valid for Panama- mainly regarding the need for an 
effective state presence in the Darien region. Panama has no 
armed forces and it is therefore necessary to strengthen the 
tactical units of the Servicio Nacional de Fronteras and the 
National Police in Panama to provide a security presence 
capable of dealing with well-armed insurgents and drug 
traffickers. The Darien is Panama's largest province but 
with the smallest population - much of the province is 
national park, and sectors of the Kuna Comarca are similarly 
unpopulated, further complicating the task of establishing a 
state presence. Panamanian authorities should look to 
protect citizens and build their presence in small towns and 
capacity to patrol rural areas. Other manifestations of the 
state, such as courts, municipal government, teachers, and 
health centers need to be expanded. As in Colombia, the 
government of Panama must take measures to provide local 
inhabitants with economic support, promote small-scale but 
environmentally sustainable agriculture and pay special 
attention to the needs of the Embera and Wounaan 
indigenous co=unities. A major threat to the region is 
deforestation, another key security concern for Panama, 
especially if it results in the cultivation of coca leaf. In this 
regard, preventing squatters from other areas in the country 
from settling in the Darien should be a priority for 
Panamanian authorities. 
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